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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
No. 19-3532 
    
 
In Re: HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION 
 
SHEET METAL WORKERS’ LOCAL 80 PENSION TRUST FUND;  
WESTCHESTER TEAMSTERS PENSION FUND, 
Appellants 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-07050) 
District Judge: Hon. Madeline C. Arleo 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-00285) 
District Judge: Hon. Stanley R. Chesler 
    
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: October 13, 2020) 
 
    
 
OPINION 
    
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 




MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (“Hertz”), its former executives, and its shareholders 
return to this Court for a second look at allegations of fraud leading to overstated revenue 
and, ultimately, a sagging share price. This time around, Plaintiffs challenge the District 
Court’s refusal to reopen the case and permit an amended complaint. But Plaintiffs’ request 
was untimely, and we will thus affirm, although, because of Hertz’s bankruptcy, only as to 
Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendants. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 In 2015, Hertz announced that “inappropriate accounting decisions” led to 
overstated revenue in prior fiscal years. (App. at 80.) Plaintiffs, a group of Hertz 
shareholders, then sued the company and three of its former executives, alleging that 
numerous statements made or approved by the defendants about the company’s finances 
during the relevant period were fraudulent.1 The District Court held that Plaintiffs’ 
complaint failed to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant[s] acted with” an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud investors,” and 
dismissed the claims. (App. at 42.) We then affirmed. In re Hertz Global Holdings Inc., 
905 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 But while the case was over, the story was not. After our decision, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission announced an agreement with Hertz to settle a regulatory 
investigation into the overstatements. That caught Plaintiffs’ attention, so they moved the 
 
1 The putative class action included the Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 80 Pension 




District Court to set aside the dismissal, reasoning that the SEC’s order contained findings 
that, if incorporated into an amended complaint, would satisfy the scienter requirement 
found lacking. While that motion was pending, Hertz sued two of the former executives, 
alleging that their conduct caused the overstatements and that Hertz was therefore entitled 
to claw back some of their incentive compensation (“Clawback Action”). Sensing a bit of 
bait and switch, Plaintiffs argued that Hertz was now accusing the executives of the very 
misconduct the company had denied. The District Court listened, but ultimately concluded 
that Plaintiffs’ motion was untimely and, in any event, without merit. That led to this 
appeal.2 
Finally, three last chapters in the story. To start, after this appeal was noticed, the 
SEC settled with two of the former executives. Next, Hertz amended its complaint in the 
Clawback Action. Plaintiffs ask us to judicially notice these two developments. And last, 
Hertz filed for bankruptcy. The parties agree the bankruptcy stays the case as to Hertz, but 
Hertz asks the case be stayed as to the individual defendants as well. Mindful of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s authority under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to extend the 
stay to non-debtor third parties, we asked Hertz about its former executives. In response, 
Hertz represented that the bankruptcy court has not extended the stay to the individual 
defendants. We proceed accordingly and our decision addresses only Plaintiffs’ claims 
against Hertz’s former executives. 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s decision for 




II.  DISCUSSION 
 This matter turns on Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
allows district courts to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment.” The grounds for relief 
are limited, and include “newly discovered evidence,” Rule 60(b)(2); “fraud . . . , 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” Rule 60(b)(3); or, a bit more 
broadly, “any other reason that justifies relief,” Rule 60(b)(6). Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3) 
require motions within “a year after the entry of the judgment,” but motions under Rule 
60(b)(6) need only “be made within a reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1). To prevent the 
general from defeating the specific, a party may not use the exception in Rule 60(b)(6) for 
motions properly brought under Rules 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(3) to “circumvent[]” the one-year 
time limitation. Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 Here, the District Court held that Plaintiffs’ motion raised “newly discovered 
evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2), making it untimely.3 We agree. “[T]he term ‘newly 
discovered evidence’ refers to ‘evidence of facts in existence at the time of trial of which 
the aggrieved party was excusably ignorant.’” Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 
1991). True, the SEC orders and the Clawback Action arose after the District Court 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint. But Plaintiffs rely not on the creation of those documents 
but on their contents, which purport to show what the executives knew when making the 
allegedly fraudulent statements. And that state of mind was a “fact[] in existence” long 
before the District Court dismissed this lawsuit. See Chilson v. Metro. Transit Auth., 796 
 
3 The District Court’s dismissal order was entered on April 28, 2017. Plaintiffs filed 




F.2d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1986) (facts in an audit were “in existence at the time of the trial,” 
even though audit itself was not); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, 733 F.2d 509, 515–
16 (8th Cir. 1984) (post-trial admission of perjury was “newly discovered evidence” since 
the perjury existed at the time of trial); cf. Betterbox Commc’ns Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 
F.3d 325, 331–32 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting Rule 60(b)(2) motion based on trademark-
cancellation notice issued after trial, since the notice “d[id] not reveal that a decision to 
cancel had been made at the time of trial”). 
 Hoping to avoid that conclusion and benefit from the open-ended, “reasonable” time 
limit of Rule 60(b)(6), Plaintiffs note that Hertz settled with the SEC and filed the 
Clawback Action after we affirmed the District Court’s dismissal order. No accident, they 
argue, seeing the timing as motivated by a desire to deprive them of facts helpful to their 
complaint. And that, they conclude, must be an “extraordinary circumstance.” See Budget 
Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that a party seeking to use 
Rule 60(b)(6) must show the existence of “extraordinary circumstances”). But even 
accepting this theory, their argument is naturally one of “fraud, misrepresentation, or 
misconduct” governed by Rule 60(b)(3) and the same one-year time limit. See Stridiron v. 
Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). Either way, therefore, the motion to reopen is 
too late. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 As Plaintiffs’ motion was untimely, the District Court properly denied it. For that 
reason, we will affirm as to the claims against the former executives. Because of its 
ongoing bankruptcy proceedings, the appeal remains stayed as to Hertz. 
